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InTroDucTIon
As the world prepares for the December 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Parties are far from focused on any singular issue that will make or break the 
negotiations over a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. 
The U.S. role in international talks has been a topic of discussion 
for many years and the Obama administration’s reengagement 
on the issue has been an important development both domesti-
cally and internationally.1 The fate of the recently released dis-
cussion draft on domestic climate legislation will certainly have 
an ongoing impact on negotia-
tions taking place in preparation 
for Copenhagen.2 The discus-
sion draft incorporates a number 
of provisions that may impact 
U.S. positioning in the coming 
months. Of particular note are 
the international clean technol-
ogy and international adaptation 
provisions which are important 
because: (1) they reflect the 
principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities that 
is essential to the existing inter-
national climate framework and 
(2) they are considered essen-
tial to balancing the continuing 
needs of developed countries 
with the growth and develop-
ment of emerging economies.3 
Together these two provisions 
offer a unique preview of the 
U.S. position on important 
issues as well as some insight into the U.S. posture on the gov-
ernance structure of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”), the Kyoto Protocol, and the international 
climate discourse generally.
an emergIng paraDIgm For The unITeD sTaTes 
In posT-2012 clImaTe negoTIaTIons
On March 31, 2009, U.S. House Energy and Commerce 
Committee Chairman Henry Waxman and Energy and Environ-
ment Subcommittee Chairman Edward Markey released a dis-
cussion draft of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, 
frequently referred to as the U.S. climate bill.4 They touted the 
bill as “clean energy legislation that will create jobs, help end 
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our dangerous dependence on foreign oil, and combat global 
warming.”5 Although the draft legislation may offer less con-
crete technology investment than previous climate bills or than 
the Obama administration has advocated,6 it is real a starting 
point for constructive U.S. engagement in both domestic and 
international climate debates.7 
In its 648 pages, the proposed bill includes two provisions 
which can provide insight into the U.S. position on the interna-
tional deployment of climate mitigation and adaptation technolo-
gies during post-Kyoto negotiations.8 First, the Exporting Clean 
Technology subtitle creates the 
International Clean Technology 
Fund (“ICTF”) which acknowl-
edges the importance of clean 
technology export for combat-
ing climate change. It provides 
“assistance to encourage wide-
spread deployment, in develop-
ing countries, of technologies 
that reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions”9 by funding projects that 
“achieve substantial reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions 
through deployment of low- or 
zero-carbon technologies.”10 
Second, the Adapting to Cli-
mate Change subtitle includes 
an International Climate Change 
Adaptation Program (“ICCAP”). 
The ICCAP encourages and 
facilitates the “deployment of 
technologies that would help 
the most vulnerable developing 
countries respond to the destabilizing impacts of climate change 
and encourage the identification and adoption of appropriate 
renewable and efficient energy technologies that are beneficial 
in increasing community-level resilience to the impacts of global 
climate change in those countries.”11 
The requirements and objectives of the Clean Technology 
Fund and the Climate Adaptation Program shed some light on the 
potential U.S. position in the upcoming post-2012 negotiations 
which will likely include extensive discussion of international 
The most vulnerable 
developing countries  
will likely be the hardest 
hit by the impacts of 
climate change. The 
instability caused by the 
disproportionate impacts 
could potentially be a 
threat multiplier for  
global instability.
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adaptation, mitigation, and technology transfer. In this context, 
it is informative to consider the impacts of the discussion draft’s 
basic framework in terms of the existing UNFCCC governance 
structure and financial additionality requirements. This, in turn, 
may provide some insight into the discussion draft’s implicit 
statement on the successes and failures of the expiring Kyoto 
Protocol.
exploring the climate bill: exporting clean 
technology
The text of the discussion draft outlines the ICTF’s estab-
lishment, governance, country eligibility, funding, and report-
ing requirements.12 It would be administered by an interagency 
group including: the Secretary of State as chairperson, the Sec-
retaries of Energy and the Treasury, the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and any other agency head 
or executive branch appointee that the President designates (the 
“interagency group”).13 Any project receiving money from the 
ICTF must serve an identified purpose, be in an eligible country, 
meet certain criteria, and funds must be distributed through a 
specific mechanism. Depending on the fund distribution mecha-
nism, the reporting and approval requirements are slightly dif-
ferent in form if not in function.14 
As noted, the Fund’s purpose is to encourage widespread 
deployment of GHG reducing technologies and assist that effort 
in a way that encourages countries to adopt their own measures 
to reduce emissions.15 Any funded project should “achieve 
substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions through 
the deployment of low- or zero-carbon technologies” and must 
be included in one of several categories.16 Those categories 
include: deploying carbon capture and sequestration technolo-
gies, deploying renewable electricity generation technologies, 
achieving increases in energy efficiency, or reducing transit sec-
tor emissions.17 The interagency group would develop project 
selection criteria that both achieve these goals and include cer-
tain required and preferred components.18 See Figure 1. 
Any country eligible to receive assistance from the Fund 
would first have to be identified as a developing country by the 
World Bank.19 It must then be included on a list of countries 
established by the President no later than January 1, 2012 based 
on criteria including that the country “has signed and ratified an 
international treaty or agreement that requires [it] to undertake 
nationally appropriate [GHG] mitigation activities [and] . . . has 
undertaken nationally appropriate mitigation activities that will 
achieve substantial reductions in [GHG] emissions, relative to 
business-as-usual levels, in a measurable, reportable, and verifi-
able manner.”20 
To achieve these goals, funding would be distributed by any 
one or a combination of the following three mechanisms: 
	 •	 Direct	assistance;	
	 •	 Agreements	with	the	World	Bank,	multilateral	development	
banks (“MDBs”), or international development institutions; 
and/or
	 •	 A	 UNFCCC	 fund	 or	 agreement	 negotiated	 under	 the	
Convention.21
If distributed directly, the Secretary of State would be autho-
rized to select projects and provide funding for eligible countries in 
the form of grants, loans, or other aid.22 However, for funding distrib-
uted either through a MDB or UNFCCC fund, a mechanism would 
be established that would apply and enforce the ICTF’s require-
ments including selection criteria.23 Regardless of who approves and 
funds the project, rigorous reporting requirements would begin with 
an initial report no later than March 1, 2012.24 Finally, it appears 
that the Secretary of State would have the ability to unilaterally sus-
pend funding for any project—funded by a domestic or international 
fund—through a yet to be determined process.25
exploring the climate bill: international climate 
change aDaptation 
The International Climate Change Adaptation Program is 
clearly written with a different purpose than the International 
Clean Technology Fund. Aside from the obvious distinctions 
between funding clean technology and adaptation programs, 
the underlying findings and purposes of the sections explicitly 
touch on different objectives and needs. The Adaptation Program 
is based on two general findings: (1) that the most vulnerable 
Figure 1. Criteria for CTF Project Selection.
Criteria for Project Selection: Clean Technology Fund
Required Criteria Preferred Criteria
substantial, measurable, reportable, verifiable reductions in 
GHG emissions relative to business as usual
maximize GHG emissions per dollar of assistance
no significant adverse effects on human health, safety, or  
welfare, the environment, or natural resources
promise to achieve large-scale GHG reductions at the sectoral or 
cross-sectoral level
the project owner/operator has demonstrated capacity to imple-
ment and maintain any technologies purchased or installed
have the potential to catalyze a shift within the host country towards 
widespread deployment of low- or zero-carbon energy technologies
the project will not cause any nret loss of U.S. jobs or  
displacement of U.S. production
the project meets other reuiremnts of the interagency group
the project will be co-financed by the host coutry government, 
private sector institutions, or a MBD
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developing countries will likely be the hardest hit by the impacts 
of climate change and (2) instability caused by these dispropor-
tionate impacts could potentially be a threat multiplier for global 
instability.26
More explicitly, the ICCAP finds that the most vulner-
able developing countries, with their lack of resource capac-
ity to adapt, may experience extreme increases in poverty and 
social and economic destabilization.27 Consequently, it is in the 
national security, economic, and environmental interests of the 
United States28 to assist these countries in developing resilience 
to impacts on “water availability, agricultural productivity, flood 
risk, coastal resources, timing of seasons, biodiversity, eco-
nomic livelihoods, health and diseases, and human migration.”29 
Furthermore, it is a U.S. obligation under the UNFCCC to pro-
vide funding that is “predictable, sustainable, and additional to 
international agreed levels of overseas development assistance” 
to aid in the cost of adaptation.30
Under the direction of the Administrator of the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (“USAID”)31 the Adaptation Pro-
gram would have two primary functions. One would be to engage 
in research and fund aid programs with the goal of carrying out 
adaptation programs in the most vulnerable developing coun-
tries.32 The second would be to mandate community engagement 
through full disclosure of information, public participation, a 
locally tailored consultation process, and, to the extent practicable, 
alignment with the recipient country’s broader development, pov-
erty alleviation, and natural resource management objectives.33 In 
executing these functions, the program would establish fairly sub-
stantial and immediate reporting requirements.34
Interestingly, these reporting requirements would apply not 
only to monies directly distributed by USAID but also to assis-
tance through international adaptation funds35 “created pursu-
ant to the [UNFCCC] . . . or an agreement negotiated under the 
Convention.”36 Any project eligibility requirements would also 
apply to a hypothetical UNFCCC fund. In order to comply, any 
fund would be required to: 
	 •	 Specify	the	terms	and	conditions	under	which	the	United	
Sates is to provide monies to the fund and under which the 
fund will disburse monies to recipient countries; 
	 •	 Ensure	that	U.S.	assistance	to	the	fund	and	the	fund’s	prin-
cipal and income are disbursed only for purposes adhering 
to those specified in the Adaptation Program; 
	 •	 Require	a	regular	meeting	of	the	fund’s	governing	body	that	
includes representation from the most vulnerable develop-
ing countries and provides full public access; 
	 •	 Require	that	local	communities	and	indigenous	peoples	in	
areas where activities or programs are planned are engaged 
through full disclosure of information, public participation, 
and consultation; 
	 •	 Spend	not	more	than	ten	percent	of	the	amounts	available	to	
the fund in any single country in any year; and 
	 •	 Require	the	international	fund	to	prepare	and	make	public	
an annual report adhering to specific requirements.37 
Examining the ICTF and ICCAP provides insight into pre-
Copenhagen U.S. positioning not only by simply highlighting 
priorities but also through an evaluation of the implicit criticisms 
of the existing framework’s governance structure and Party par-
ticipation. Whether or not a climate agreement moves forward 
this year, a frequent theme is present throughout both sections of 
the discussion draft: preparation for participation in a UNFCCC 
post-2012 climate negotiation and agreement.38
exIsTIng InTernaTIonal Framework:  
unFccc & The kyoTo proTocol
The UNFCCC creates “an institutional framework for the 
progressive development of the [climate] regime through proto-
cols or amendments.”39 The UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol, which 
sets emission reduction targets for developed country Parties,40 
expires in 2012. It has faced criticisms of its substance, enforce-
ability, and the impact of its key market and its flexibility mecha-
nisms, which include emissions trading, the Clean Development 
Mechanism, and Joint Implementation.41 
The UNFCCC “sets an overall framework for intergov-
ernmental efforts to tackle the challenge posed by climate 
change.”42 Its objective is to stabilize GHG “concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system.”43 In order to 
achieve this objective, Parties should protect the climate system 
“on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”44 The 
concept of equitable, global protection is reflected in the alloca-
tion of Parties’ voting rights. Unlike many other international 
instruments or funding mechanisms, the UNFCCC gives each 
Party to the Convention one vote—regardless of population or 
financial status.45
Consistent with the concept of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, the UNFCCC requires developed country Par-
ties to “provide new and additional financial resources to meet 
the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in 
complying with their obligations.”46 This financial additional-
ity requirement should lead to increased support for technology 
development, transfer, and deployment from developed to devel-
oping countries.47 In fact, many developing countries expect that 
developed country Parties will increase their funding because of 
the “moral and practical claim that [they] bear a much larger share 
of the responsibility for historical and current greenhouse emis-
sions, and have greater financial and technical resources.”48
The Kyoto Protocol also allocates one vote to each Party49 
and requires “new and additional financial resources to meet the 
agreed costs incurred by developing country Parties.”50 How-
ever, Kyoto goes significantly beyond the UNFCCC by creat-
ing quantified emissions reductions. It creates mechanisms to 
achieve these goals, particularly the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (“CDM”), which is informative in this discussion since it 
represents a significant facet of the existing UNFCCC structure 
for expansion of clean technologies in developing countries.51
The CDM allows projects in developing countries to earn 
emission reductions credits that can then be traded in a carbon 
market.52 It also creates an alternative mechanism for developed 
countries to meet their obligations without directly reducing their 
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own emissions, which is arguably more economically efficient. 
Theoretically, this dual goal helps developed countries meet their 
GHG emission reduction targets while stimulating sustainable 
development and emission reductions in developing countries.53 
However, the relationship between CDM projects and sustainable 
development is frequently the subject of debate:54 does the CDM 
help developing countries achieve sustainable development or 
does it help developed countries 
create low-cost emission reduc-
tion credits?55 Criticisms have 
ranged from the actual impact of 
offsets to the cost of reductions, 
and from local environmental 
integrity and community involve-
ment to the CDM’s long term 
viability as a mechanism to pro-
mote sustainable development.56 
As the prelude to Copenhagen 
continues, developing countries 
are calling for more effective 
technology transfer than the 
CDM has yet achieved.57
The proposeD u.s. clean Technology FunD 
& InTernaTIonal clImaTe change aDapTaTIon 
plan: InTernaTIonal legal ImplIcaTIons
Clearly, the ICTF language was crafted considering the 
expiration of Kyoto. “Not later than January 1, 2012, and annu-
ally thereafter, the President shall determine and publish a list of 
countries eligible for assistance.”58 It goes on to require that an 
eligible country must have “signed and ratified an international 
treaty or agreement”59 and explicitly authorizes distribution of 
assistance through a fund created pursuant to the UNFCCC or 
agreement negotiated under the Convention.60 The Adaptation 
Fund was also drafted with the existing international climate 
structure in mind. It requires that 40–60% of its funding be dis-
tributed through an international fund created under the UNFCCC 
or agreement pursuant to the Convention.61 Furthermore, it notes 
that under the United States’ UNFCCC obligations, funding for 
adaptation programs must be predictable, sustainable, and addi-
tional to existing overseas development aid.62 
the international clean technology funD
The ICTF presents several issues when considering how it 
might fit into a UNFCCC framework. First and foremost, since 
the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and CDM all have additional-
ity requirements,63 which is an extremely important point for 
developing country Parties, it is safe to assume that a similar 
requirement will be included in any future agreement.64 How-
ever, the ICTF includes no financial additionality language. This 
is particularly significant since the ICCAP includes explicit ref-
erence to the UNFCCC additionality requirement.65 The differ-
ence may imply that it was intentionally excluded from the ICTF 
subtitle. Further, the absence of additionality language leaves 
some ambiguity as to whether or how it could fulfill any addi-
tionality requirements in a future protocol. Although it is clearly 
new funding today, it may be difficult differentiate it from exist-
ing overseas development aid, which is ineligible to fulfill the 
UNFCCC’s “new and additional” requirement.66 
The ICTF could also create potential conflicts in terms of non-
financial requirements and governance mechanisms. For example, 
regardless of how or where monies are distributed, all projects 
must conform to the Fund’s extensive selection criteria and report-
ing requirements.67 Thus, if funds 
are to be distributed through an 
agreement to be negotiated under 
the UNFCCC there would be two 
options for compliance. First, the 
agreement would have to incor-
porate the explicit requirements 
included in the U.S. legislation. 
Or second, the agreement would 
have to incorporate a mechanism 
by which Parties could specifi-
cally approve and enforce unique, 
individual requirements. On top 
of the obligation to comply with 
U.S. requirements, the discussion 
draft incorporates a component 
which may preclude any ICTF-funded project from incorporation 
into an international fund: it appears to give the U.S. Secretary of 
State the authority to unilaterally suspend or terminate assistance if 
a facet of a project does not operate in compliance with its origi-
nal approval.68 Not only does this appear to be an impracticable 
demand to incorporate, but it also conflicts with the UNFCCC’s 
themes of equity and the concepts of fostering sustainable develop-
ment as defined by the host-country and encouraging local control 
of internationally financed projects. 
Finally, the ICTF’s requirements for identifying eligible coun-
tries could decrease the feasibility of distributing funds through an 
international mechanism. It defines eligible country as a develop-
ing country that has already taken measures towards considerable 
overall improvements and mitigation activities “that will achieve 
substantial reductions [in GHG emissions]. . . relative to business-
as-usual levels.”69 While this may make environmental sense, it 
does not reflect the standards under which the UNFCCC, Kyoto 
Protocol, or CDM programs should operate.70 The Convention 
does not explicitly include guidance regarding the contributions 
of developing countries to technology development,71 but the 
recent Bali Action Plan recognizes the importance of developed 
countries’ role in assisting developing countries with technology 
finance and “taking into account social and economic conditions 
[of a developing country] and other relevant factors.”72 Inflexibly 
requiring a developing country to “prove itself” before becom-
ing eligible for funding does not reflect a program created on the 
“basis of equity and in accordance with . . . common but differen-
tiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”73 
the international climate change aDaptation plan
The ICCAP is more explicitly written to reflect current UNFCCC 
and future protocol obligations. It includes specific reference to 
Clean technology transfer 
and climate adaptation are 
among the most important 
topics to be discussed 
in upcoming UNFCCC 
negotiations.
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UNFCCC additionality requirements and requires a percentage of 
assistance to go through a hypothetical UNFCCC or future protocol 
fund. It does not include, however, specific language explaining how 
or when its funding should be considered new and additional. The 
inclusion of language in domestic legislation specifying an intention 
that overseas development funding is new and additional pursuant to 
the UNFCCC requirements is by no means required. But given the 
longstanding confusion regarding how to determine exactly what is 
new and additional and the requirement that donor countries “clarify 
how they have determined that [resources are] . . . new and addi-
tional,”74 it would be good practice for a donor country to be explicit 
about its intention upon creation of new funding.
The Plan’s requirements also invoke language of sustainable 
development and community engagement.75 Although the goals 
of adaptation programs and the CDM are certainly not analogous, 
the language here appears to be aimed at addressing some of the 
contentious issues identified in CDM implementation—issues 
that inherently arise when developed countries fulfill international 
obligations within the boundaries of developing countries. For 
example, it requires quantifiable performance goals, the creation 
of specific performance indicators, extensive, country-specific 
community engagement, and alignment with each country’s 
development goals.76 While these are laudable inclusions, there 
currently are not mechanisms identified to further develop, define, 
and implement these goals at an international level. 
Much like the ICTF, the ICCAP subtitle would impose its 
own to be established requirements, enforcement, and reporting 
mechanisms equally on any project funded through an interna-
tional fund. The ICCAP even goes a step further by outlining spe-
cific requirements for an eligible fund which include reporting, 
governing body meeting, and eligibility standards. This is a bold 
prerequisite for a hypothetical funding mechanism and has the 
potential to create substantial ambiguities and enforcement chal-
lenges, as well as conflicts between negotiators, funding partners, 
and the developing countries where the projects ultimately occur. 
Finally, creating a haze over all of its requirements, the ICCAP 
would have two overarching purposes. In addition to aiding the most 
vulnerable developing countries in adapting to climate impacts, its 
second stated purpose is protecting U.S. security interests.77 This 
significantly changes the UNFCCC climate discourse and empha-
sizes the U.S.-centric focus of the entire legislation.78 While national 
security may have become part of the global climate discourse, it 
certainly not part of the existing legal framework. Focusing on U.S. 
security interests will help a bill pass in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, but focusing on global political stability and its contribu-
tion to peace will be more significant at the international level, and 
these things, arguably, are not too different.
The proposeD u.s. clean Technology 
FunD & clImaTe change aDapTaTIon plan: 
InTernaTIonal polIcy ImplIcaTIons 
Despite the potential conflicts between the U.S. climate bill 
and the existing international legal infrastructure and discourse, 
it is important to acknowledge that the proposed legislation is 
simply a discussion draft. As the United States re-engages in 
the international climate debate,79 the discussion draft’s value 
may be its insight into how and why these provisions strengthen 
and clarify the U.S. position. In order for the 2009 Copenhagen 
negotiations to be successful in creating a post-2012 agreement 
many experts agree that “the United States must lead at home.”80 
To achieve this, comprehensive domestic legislation to reduce 
emissions is essential, particularly legislation that includes sup-
port for developing countries.81 By discussing this bill in the 
U.S. Congress, the United States is beginning to indicate the 
level of support it may be prepared to give developing countries 
in the global fight against climate change. This bill could be read 
as a first step towards to putting “a concrete and comprehensive 
offer on the table.”82 
In preparation for international negotiations, any domes-
tic legislation must include international technology diffusion 
and development which are increasingly considered essential 
to combating climate change.83 This is particularly true where 
international policy structures do not have full international par-
ticipation.84 Including international technology provisions in 
domestic legislation may be a signal that the United States is 
prepared to go forward with negotiations even without full or 
substantially equal international participation, a longtime road-
block to U.S. involvement.
conclusIon
Experts continue to identify countless “essential” points 
to a successful Copenhagen outcome.85 Two recurring themes 
are “actions by developing countries [and] finance for mitiga-
tion and adaptation.”86 The international technology provisions 
of the discussion draft address those two concerns directly and 
signal a potential shift in the U.S. policy outlook. While domes-
tic legislation outlining technology and adaptation priorities is 
important, it is equally important not to unilaterally impose U.S. 
will upon the world. How the proposed provisions will func-
tion domestically must be more thoroughly developed. Perhaps 
more importantly, how these policies will be incorporated into a 
post-Kyoto agreement must continue to be a vital part of the dis-
course, since clean technology transfer and climate adaptation 
are among the most important topics to be discussed in upcom-
ing UNFCCC negotiations. 
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upDaTe
The following language should be added to the article 
by Jacqueline Peel and Lee Godden in SDLP’s 2009 Cli-
mate Law Reporter. This is an update to the Walker case 
which was discussed in detail in that article. See Jacqueline 
Peel & Lee Godden, Planning for Adaptation to Climate 
Change: Landmark Cases from Australia, SuStainable 
Dev. l. & pol’y, Winter 2009, at 37, 39. 
The New South Wales Court of Appeal,1 later over-
turned the decision of Justice Biscoe on a technicality, 
finding that whilst the ‘public interest’ was an implied 
mandatory consideration, the ESD principles were not. 
The Court held that, although the Minister did not consider 
ESD principles, that oversight only had relevance for the 
inadequacy of a ‘public interest’ consideration, which was 
a merits-based matter. The merits approach was to be con-
trasted to an overarching failure to consider the public inter-
est at all, which would be susceptible to judicial review.2 
Nonetheless, the majority of the Court stressed, ‘the prin-
ciples of ESD are likely to come to be seen as so plainly an 
element of the public interest, in relation to most if not all 
decisions, that failure to consider them will become strong 
evidence of failure to consider the public interest and/or to 
act bona fide in the exercise of powers granted to the Minis-
ter, and thus become capable of avoiding decisions.’3 Thus 
while the majority judgment set a steep threshold test for 
declaring decision-making invalid, it does not preclude 
ESD principles as a relevant consideration in determining 
the public interest in climate change contexts.
Endnotes:
1 Minister for Planning v. Walker (2008) 161 LGERA 423; [2008] 
NSWCA 224.
2 Id. at 40, 41, 44.
3 Id. at 56.
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